1
Hegel adored Napoleon Bonaparte. Bonapartism marks the beginning of modern totalitarianism, because Napoleon made an unequalled militarist drill and a likewise disciplin a standard duty, and an international standard. What can be said about prussian virtues and the typically prussian cadaver-obedience ( [ger.] "Kadavergehorsam"), it is true even more so for Napoleons militarist rule.

Hegel understood the state not only as an entity of civil law, but as a divine-royal order, as Kant, who at least respected the german king, and rejected the burgeois revolution principally only in germany.

Because of this, in Hegels state not only laws are the rule, but also the principles. While democracy acknowledges the reign of the people, instead of an ideology, Hegel created the philosophical basis for a principally authoritarian ideology, and he set the state, despite all earlier partitionings of state power, to be equal with the rule of god.

Hegels absolute idealism describes a kind of reason, which understands itself as all reality, but also Hegel unterstands only the state to be a truly objective entity, and the individual only as objective, insofar it is citizen, because the individual and objectivity are inconsolable.

Hegel describes in his phenomenology a similar symbiosis of individual reason, with the world soul, because the reason of the human has gained knowledge and wisdom not prior to the cognisant world soul.

This means, that Hegel understood the order, constituted by a state, and the mind of mankind, as measures of individual life and thinking. The time of Hegel was a time of slavery, therefore there still exists a class of humans for hegel, who are no citizens, but only subjects without rights and therefore without duties, and likewise, without duties, and therefore without rights. Hegel, by this, also became a trailblazer for colonialism.

If Hegel writes about the spirit of the state, that it is not only phenomenon and necessity, and means law,  and the duty, to come true to laws, but also an objective ideality, he created an opportunity for ideologies.

2
Hegels concept of evil is naive, and false. Children already, so Hegel, would become evil at an early age, and would have to be educated rigidly, because of this. Although children don't lack the will, which, in fact, as Hegel understood correctly, in general is the origin of evil, but children usually lack the intelligence, to conceive truly evil thoughts. Children are, if at all, aggressive, but not evil. The child, which appears to be evil for adults, practices mimetical behaviour, and learned from adults very well, how evil articulates itself. While children often are strong of will, and therefore seem aversive, so adults want to imply the evil attitude of children, but there is no evil in this simple aversiveness of will. 

According to Hegels understanding, evil can be compared with good, because it originates from morality, and furthermore, morality and evil would, because of this have a common root. This is actually unthinkable. Both judgements seemingly can be cast over arbitrary behaviour, because purposes can theoretically be substituted. Evil only appears as a mimetical entity, mimicking good, and coming from the same origin. Humanity is conditioned by its holy scriptures, who often contain myths about dichotomous, binary, and reciprocal good and evil entitites, but that is not sufficient for a scientific approach to evil.

By negating the good, and yielding the bad, we do not concurrently get an absolute inversion of good, in evil.

    #

Also, according to Hegel, it is the subject, from which emerges evil, through the exclusive acknowledgment of own and self-purposes, and thus the subject, insofar it is evil, never acts selflessly, or altruistic. But this definition is not enough, if we have to reach consistency with the collective behaviour of germans in the Third Reich, who sacrificed themselves, to fight Hitlers total war. So evil can not be the realization of exclusive egoism.

But if the germans in the Third Reich acted as a majority, because they voted for Hitler, while they were citizens of a democracy in the Republic of Weimar, we would have to conclude, that evil can be the result of dynamics which can not be regarded other than objective.

Corresponding with political logic, and Hegel, a population could, as long as it is only big enough, and mass as much as majority, never be or act evilly, because its purposes are collective, and therefore altruist enough, and, because the people are also, if a majority, always a constituent of some form of right, by which revolutions are legitimized aposteriorily.

Then, evil would have to be understood as something approximating, or equivalent with objectivity. But this again is impossible, since revolutions are not generally good, and neither is a genocide, if only the population which perpetrates it, is numerous enough to constitute a majority.

Thus, evil is neither exclusively subjective, nor can collective behaviours be called objective, but instead, they can, under certain conditions, be called evil.

    #

The more the psychological concept of drive comes into view, it becomes obvious, that the will of the sadists and the necrophiles, of the racists and the sexists very well is the origin of their evil, but, in case of increasing perversion of volition, there often is the problem, to estimate this volition in proportion to its vehemence, and in its proportion to its evilness. to be the result of a lack of freedom, or of a pathology, by which the evil within would be overweighted.

Evil, following such a criticism directed at its theory, is not thinkable without a form of perverted reason. But this reason, again, is not necessarily subjective, but adult, it isn't necessarily vehement, but possibly very banal, but at least until the conduction of the evil deed, desinterested in any conscious reflection and criticism of its own immorality.

Negativity is a medium and an expression of evil, but not all, which is negative affect or negativity of thinking, is therefore evil.

3

If Hegel is criticized, because he was trailblazing totalitarianism, it becomes conspicuous, that Hegels concept of evil is in no way applicable to that, which since the crisis of humanity during three world wars in the 20th century, counts as evil. Insofar Hegel already pursues the child for putative ability to be evil, he is only one, besides Kant, of many authoritarian pedagogues, who lack any kind of understanding of the disadvantages of black, or authoritarian education.

The historical concept of evil, insofar it often means worldly power, is incongruent with the concept, that Hegel worked out, because he understood evil to be an excess of subjectivity and of the subject. Hegel was a conservative philosopher, keeping monarchy in high regard.

Hegel can not be blamed, to have invented totalitarianism, and the legitimation of the rule of evil, because he lacked understanding. Indeed did Hegel, like Nietzsche and Schopenhauer too, form the spirit, from wich emerged Hitlerism.

"Following Hegel there will be no further philosophy", germans resounded. Insofar Hegel can be reproached for his fondness of totalitarianism, because of his systematic philosophy, germans did at least contribute to this association.

The joy to reduce the future on a big name of the present, is the grandeur of exuberant praise, but hints at lazyness. The Germans following Hegel had not at all the intention, to busy themselves with an own philosophy, or at least with a scrutiny and criticism of the renowned ones. Kant, too was hogged superficially and generally, with the worst consequences, 150 years later. Had the Nazis read Kant, Hegel, and i.e. Nietzsche, then the Germans would have found reasons not to openly declare a total war on other nations, but instead to find the right means to bring peace to mankind without waging a war for its sake.

4
The hegelian concept of "concrete totality"  does not only have the meaning god, but is being applied to other things too. concretely total, so hegel, could even be the ability to apprehend, and the body of the individual human, the human subject.

Of course, Hegel proceeded arbitrarily with his concept, and applied, what actually designates an interuniversality of things, on that, what is only a part of something bigger than itself, and has, in its limited sphere of existence, its equal. Furthermore, Hegel had no scientifical, or more precise, anthropological, and cultural psychological concept of god, or of evil. He lacked a theory of the emergence of the concept of god, and thus he lacked a more complete, or at least sufficient knowledge of the conditions and origins of divine myth and divine faith. Because of this, Hegels concept of evil, and his concept of god in the same manner, was deficient, and subjective.

The commandment, not to produce images of god, has the meaning, that no human can know the kingdom of god until it is created, and not only, that humanity today can not know, how it will live in the future.

That the concepts of god and evil, through the commonly human behaviours of hallowing and defixion only have a sense in the social contexts of a sacrifice, and that, by this, their mythicized expressions deviate and divert from their conditions of accruement, should have perplexed Hegel, especially because one meaning of god is, that the future will be disclosed from human ken.

It is these ideological impressions of the totality of god, and the directly comparable divinity and objectivity of the state, and of the necessity, to subordinate oneself as a political subject obediently, and the imagination, an arbitrary philosophy could be a total, or ultimative, because reliably diagnosing and divining philosophy, and the naivety, in face of a concept of god and evil, which comes about only through sacrifices, and is their social prerequisite, which spurred the modern totalitarian regimes of modernity to employ a double moral, the culturelessness of brainwashing, the inhuman sacrifical policy, and undemocratic, remote autocracy.

5
Research into the text of Hegels "Phenomenology of Spirit" yields an example of this double morality, since the seemingly primary object of it is the mind, in its meaning of intelligence, while the moral suggestion, that people must sacrifice themselves for the sake of higher, stately goods, cramp the text, and turn the perspective of its readers to the duty to fulfill collective duties to existential degrees, that is, toward the obligation to spiritualize themselves accordingly for self-sacrifice.

By fulfilling this political purpose, Hegels text executed a function for the kind of totalitarianism, that started with bonapartism.

Not only has Hegel been an idealist only according to his own understanding, because materialist and objectivistic arguments make up substantial points of the content of his phenomenology, but it is the transfiguration of the hegelian self-sacrifice, like a thread recurring in the whole text, a discernible socio-moral preparation for a political possibility of the totally ruled subjects, afterwards. Hegelian idealism, as a demand directed at the people, that they ought to be ready to make sacrifices on the behalf of the state - and the aggressively imperial ambitions of its rulers - is a false idealism, for sake of materialism. Consequently, Hegel was and is being kept in regard as a precursor of marxism and communism.

6
Hegels understanding of necessary belief into the state, which is a belief requested directly by virtues of state citizenship, and the readiness for self-sacrifice for the sake of the state, must be demarcated towards Immanuel Kants belief in reason, which is a belief in divine reason, revealing itself through the consciously and intelligently acting human.

But while Kants belief in reason should have prepared a philosophically intellectual emancipation from authoritarian and socially dysfunctional, because unintelligent clerical institutions, their abusive habits, politics and their rituals, and, by this, an age of secularization, Hegels belief in the state prepared the sacralization of the state policy, and a turning towards political religions by popular politicians.

Both started their as such laudable enterprise from but the wrong side, because Kant was discontent more with the religious jewry, than with the clerically institutionalized christianity. Today, Kant is being understood as an early omen of the holocaust, because of his extraordinarily misunderstandable, and at times careless phrasings. 150 years before the european jews were annihilated in nazi death camps, Immanuel Kant wrote, that an "euthanasia of judaism" would make sense. This fateful choice of words is one reason for the actual understanding, that Kant was an early antisemitic proponent of german enlightenment. 

I assert, that Kant would for sure have chosen a different phrasing, had he only known, what would follow afterwards, because he also criticized the manic german nationalism already in the 18th century, at a time, when the later german nation was only in the making, by chancellors like bismarck, and the spirit of german national consciousness was starting to turn into a chauvinism, leading to german colonialism. At that time already Kant understood well, that germans had a notion to become nationalist maniacs, and asked for cosmopolitanism and conscious patriotism instead (Irrlitz, 2015, 37).  Of course, he only meant a general secularization, one that would have had to include clerical jewry too, and it is also necessary to correct the false opinion, that the merely chauvinist Kant was a racist.

7
Hegels belief in the state was a philosophical concept of what german thinking is and should be, which also justified the notorious prussian cadaver-obedience, and which was refined by Arthur Schopenhauer in an antisemitic way, by demanding from the germans, not to be as materialistic, as the jews.  

The research into antisemitism understands Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Fichte, Schleiermacher and Schopenhauer equally as ideological trailblazers of german Nationalsocialism. Whether Kant would have wanted it that way, 250 years ago, or absolutely not, is of secondary importance.

Indeed, it is completely irrelevant, whether Kant was a true antisemite or not, if a german society, imbued with national-socialist manic spirit by hitlerite agitators, abused Kants writings and Kant himself as a symbol for german nationalism, to prepare and justify murderous politics. The same is true for Hegel and Schopenhauer. 

Because of this, Hegels philosophy can very well be understood as an ideal breeding ground for later totalitarianisms.

Not only is life that, what is made of it, but equivalently evil is, what is made of it, and of the thinking, which leads to evil.

For the sake of serious and reasonable Secularization, it would have to be researched, whether a secularization, initiated, steered, and coerced upone society from the outside or the above, would at all be possible, without endangering that society existentially, not only, because each political movement of whatever kind would have to be understood first of all as another political religion, but also, because again, a hallowing, which is a sacrifice, this time of religiosity itself, would be the matter of this movement. The demand for radical secularization, as articulated by Kant, is naive at least, and because of this, it is risky too.

Fichte also prepared totalitarianism, his design of a statehood, united through one nation and one religion, is an anticipation of the enforced conformity in the later nationalsocialist and communist societies, his idea of a register for every member of the national religion, within which every socially relevant deed and purpose is entered, anticipates the Stasi-Records of the later GDR, his idea of a closed mercantile state anticipated the socialist foreign and trading policies of the later communist states. Even more so, Fichtes Ideology oozes, like that of Hegel, of a necrophile sacrificial suggestion.

8
We still have to explore, how influential a single philosophy can be. Much of the momentum gained through a critique directed against german idealist philosophers of the classical era is gained by the implicit assumption, that philosophies emit influence exclusively by themselves. The counterposition understands philosophies as epiphenomena and intellectual consequences of an epochal spirit, a zeitgeist, who articulates itself through them, but that do not achieve much through the single intellectual articulation, be it that of a classical magnum opus, but which confirm rather that, out of which they emerged..

By this, a relation of a validating kind would evolve between the epochal spirit and the single philosophy. The philosopher dignifies the zeitgeist through its explication, theoretization and derivation, and society afterwards dignifies the intellectual through resounding acknowledgment, promotion, and citation of her or his works and ideas. This thinking is realistic - there is hardly a human, who can gain name and glory, if his understanding, values, logics, behaviours and concepts differ all too much from those of society.

If the causal power of a philosophy in such a context of mutual validation can be adequately estimated this way, then there is a natural and logical limit to all possible causal effects, that has to be ruled in, because that, which appears to society to be too aburd, novel, unfounded and complicated, she will surely igore, while that, what comes close to it, or which is already set up within it, if not in such articulate form, as through critical and refined philosophy, society will usually tolerate, if not even validate.

The conclusion of this is a relativization, simply put, because there would have been the holocaust without Immanuel Kant's callous phrasing, and there would have been totalitarianism, without Hegels philosophy.

Bibliography :

Immanuel Kant, gesammelte Werke

Irrlitz, Gerd, "Kant Handbuch. Leben und Werk", 3. Auflage, J.B. Metzler Verlag. 2015

G.W.F Hegel, "Phänomenologie des Geistes", u.a.

Gronke, H., Meyer, T., Neißer, B. [Hrsg.], "Antisemitismus bei Kant und anderen Denkern der Aufklärung", Königshausen & Neumann, 2001

Foucault, Michel, "Überwachen und Strafen", Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag

Brumlik, Micha, "Deutscher Geist und Judenhaß. Das Verhältnis des philosophischen Idealismus zum Judentum", Lucherhand Verlag, 2000